(a) Social, economic and political

Namibia has a progressive constitution and is a multi-party democracy. However, the political dominance of the ruling SWAPO Party persists as shown during the 2004 elections held on the 15 and 16 November. SWAPO won the National Assembly vote with 76 % support, giving the party 55 seats − exactly the same as it held in the 2000-2005 parliament − out of the 72 available. SWAPO has seen its support in the country rise from 57 % in the 1989 UN-supervised elections to 76 % in the 1999 ballot. This dominance by SWAPO is attributed to the opposition parties struggle to present themselves as credible alternatives.

Furthermore, the ruling party is still able to capitalise on its image as the victors of the liberation struggle, a record of steady, if unremarkable economic growth and public spending that has largely focused on health and education. In contrast to SWAPO’s fortunes, the main opposition party in 1989, the Democratic Turnhalle Alliance (DTA), has seen its share of the vote dwindle from 29 % in 1989 to 5 % in 2004. The DTA has never been able to shake off its image as a puppet of the South African colonial regime prior to independence and in 2003 saw two of its founding members − the Republican Party (RP) and the National Unity Democratic Organisation (NUDO) − peel away to contest these elections on their own.

Aside from the gradual disintegration of the DTA, the other major development in opposition politics since independence was the formation of the Congress of Democrats (CoD) in 1999. Although, initially perceived as a significant threat by SWAPO, the party has failed to make much headway in its first seven years, winning only 7% of the vote during the 2004 election.

Namibia’s proportional representation system appears to be encouraging the development of ethnic niche parties whose appeal is to core support groups that can deliver one or two seats in the National Assembly. In the 1999 elections it was possible to gain one seat with just over 3,500 votes countrywide. The National Unity Democratic Organisation (NUDO) − which broke away from the DTA in 2003 − gained three seats due to its support base among the Herero people. Another ethnic party − the United Democratic Front (UDF) − increased its share of seats from two to three seats thanks mainly to support from the Damara community in western Namibia. NUDO and the UDF each gained 4 % of the ballots cast. The Republican Party − a founding member of the DTA that also went its own way in 2003 − picked up one seat with 2 % of the vote. Monitor Action Group (MAG) − the rump of the old National Party in Namibia − defied predictions of its demise and held on to its one seat in the National Assembly.

The results mean that SWAPO faces a fragmented opposition with six parties occupying 17 seats against SWAPO’s 55. Although the CoD is the largest of the opposition parties it is not certain to become the official opposition as smaller parties could form a coalition to beat the CoD’s five seats. The parties have several months to negotiate such a deal as the new National Assembly will not meet until after March 21 2005.

SWAPO candidate Hifikepunye Pohamba convincingly won the presidential race, collecting 76 % of the votes against six other contenders. Ben Ulenga of the CoD was second with 7%. The result showed Pohamba gained slightly more votes than his party and his level of support almost matched President Sam Nujoma’s 77% in the 1999 elections.

The turnout of 83 % was the highest since Namibia’s UN-supervised elections of 1989 when 97 % of registered voters turned out. The nomination of a new candidate to take over from the SWAPO’s founding father President Nujoma appeared to be a strong motivating factor for party supporters to turn out in large numbers, while the campaigns of two new parties − NUDO and the RP − drew in voters, who might previously have been apathetic.

The elections were widely regarded as free and fair − with observers from the Southern African Development Community (SADC) and the Electoral Institute of Southern Africa (EISA) giving their approval. Local observers from the Namibia Non-governmental Organisations Forum (Nangof) praised the election process but called for the abolition of the tendered ballot system, which allows voters to vote anywhere rather than just in their home constituencies. Most opposition parties accepted the fairness of the polls, although the airtime allocation policy of the Namibian Broadcasting Corporation (NBC) was criticised as being biased to the ruling party.

The CoD, however, said the elections had been flawed and called for an audit of the votes cast. The party said lengthy delays, which saw the announcement of results from 107 constituencies dragged out over five days, had undermined the credibility of the process, while the accuracy of the voters roll was also questioned.

Following speculation that Nujoma might seek to change the Constitution again to allow to him to run for a fourth term in office, the SWAPO leader confirmed in early 2004 that he would be standing down. In May he succeeded in ensuring his nominee to be the party’s presidential candidate, Hifikepunye Pohamba, won out against Hidipo Hamutenya and Nahas Angula at a special party Congress. Nujoma effectively saw off Hamutenya’s challenge by sacking him as Foreign Minister just days before the Congress. Hamutenya − who was perceived as the anti- Nujoma candidate − and his supporters were further sidelined throughout the year, culminating in their poor performances at the October gathering to select SWAPO candidates for the National Assembly elections.

Pohamba is believed to have sent out conciliatory signals to the Hamutenya camp - indicating that after the elections there may be a way back into Cabinet and other top positions. How this is handled will be one of the first tests of how the Pohamba-Nujoma relationship will work over the next five years. With Nujoma set to stay on as SWAPO President until at least 2007, his continuing political presence is likely to cast a large shadow over Pohamba’s rule. The strong influence of his old friend will be welcomed by Pohamba who has shown little ambition to occupy the highest office. However, there may be different reactions from other interest groups, including Cabinet, the party politburo and party wings, who might want to move more speedily into a post-Nujoma era.

SWAPO is also the dominant party at regional and local government levels. In May 2004 SWAPO won some 65 % of the vote in local authority elections, with its nearest rival − the CoD − gaining just over 10 %. SWAPO won 82 out of the 102 constituencies in the 1999 Regional Council elections. However, there have been more signs of voter flexibility at the local level, with Councils accused of corruption and incompetence being voted out (for example at Bethanie, Otavi, and Gibeon in 2004) and residents associations playing a greater role.

Some 11 years after their inception, Regional Councils still play a largely advisory and symbolic role. The policy of decentralisation − introduced in the late 1990s − has progressed slowly partly due to a lack of skills and resources at regional level. There has also been a growing view that government is less than totally committed to decentralisation, preferring a de-concentration of centralised power rather than the empowerment of local communities normally envisaged as being at the heart of a decentralisation process. However, there are practical problems connected to the transfer of powers and responsibilities to the local level. In the last year at least five of Namibia’s 46 local authorities have been the focus of allegations of corruption and malpractice, with several facing water and power shutdowns as a result of the debts they owed to parastatals. While such high levels of debt were in part brought about by the incompetence of Councils, local authorities do face the dilemma of trying to squeeze money for basic services out of impoverished communities.

According to the 2003 Afrobarometer survey for Namibia only 54 % of respondents preferred democracy to other forms of government − the lowest figure since the survey started in 1999. The finding raised questions as to whether support for democracy is dwindling in Namibia. In the 1989 election Namibia recorded one of the highest ever turnouts in a non-compulsory election (97 %). Since then there has been a steady decline in turnout, which was estimated at 45 % in the last local authority elections.

The 2002 Afrobarometer survey found that unemployment was seen as the most important issue in Namibia, ahead of HIV-AIDS.

The clichéd view is that Namibia’s civil society is weak and largely ineffective. The recently issued draft Civic Organisation Partnership Policy − which after 14 years is the closest Government and civil society have come to formalising their relationship

Few NGOs get involved in hands-on political lobbying and few are prepared to actively attempt to set the agenda on politics, apart from some women’s organisations. This may be because government and party rhetoric against certain organisations has had a chilling effect on others becoming more openly political. Many do not get involved and even avoid political controversies. While few are pro-active in lobbying, many organisations do send representatives to government-sponsored workshops on policy matters and give feedback when asked to comment on a draft bill or policy, although they are rarely the initiators of such consultations.

Despite the rather quiescent roles of many organisations, there are some concerns about proposals that Government register all NGOs contained in the draft Civic Organisations Partnership policy.

Unfortunately these discussions come at a time when Zimbabwe has introduced a bill that bars foreign funding for organisations that deal with governance and human rights issues. Some NGOs are concerned that the registration process would be used as a way of controlling NGOs and that those that refuse to be registered will possibly be punished.

Government says it does not want to control civil society, but at the same time it is clear that it sees a partnership in terms of civil society organisations (CSOs) sharing government’s vision. In its Vision 2030 document, the worst-case scenario mapped out for 30 years hence is a civil society that acts in opposition to government. If civil society is genuinely functioning in 2030 it is almost certain that some CSOs will be opposed to government at least on some issues.

Most Namibia NGOs depend on overseas funding. There is a perpetual fear that this funding will soon run out and some perplexity about how to respond to donors’ demands that organisations be self-sustaining. And it is not only donors who want CSOs to be self-sustaining. Government in its Vision 2030 summary document urges NGOs to diversify sources of income by relying on membership contributions, corporate funding, local fundraising, market investments, and income generation and loan schemes. Despite this many organisations feel that they have few realistic options to be self-sustaining, having attempted to source local funding with little success. Some organisations have had success in raising part of their income themselves through selling consultancy services, while Women’s Action for Development (WAD) recently became a shareholder in a South African travel agency as a step towards sustainability.

In 2003 the economy grew by 3.7 %, the highest rate of growth since 1997. Strong performances by the fish processing sector and the construction industry contributed to the improved figure. The mining sector continued to struggle because of the rand-US dollar exchange rate. Namibia continues to be a member of the Common Monetary Area and the value of the Namibia dollar is the same as the rand.

Namibia is the fifth largest diamond producer in the world and a leader in offshore diamond mining. The downturn in mining revenue led to a N$1 billion shortfall in tax revenue in 2003 and a fall in the value of diamond exports from N$5.2 billion to N$3.6 million. With the Skorpion zinc mine in the south of Namibia gearing up for full production and the Ramatex textile factory now exporting to the US, the prospects for improved economic growth in 2004 are quite good.

Between 1994 and 2002 the Namibian economy grew by an average of 3.4 % − a steady rate of growth but not enough to create jobs and incomes for much of the population. GDP per capita was measured at N$16,509 in 2004 − putting Namibia in the lower middle-income bracket of countries. However, estimates indicate that income distribution is highly skewed in Namibia, which has Gini coefficient of 0.7 (where 0 stands for an equal society and 1 for the most unequal society).

Periodic droughts and rising levels of HIV infection have exacerbated poverty levels. In 2003 some 345 000 Namibians in rural areas were designated to receive food aid after poor harvests in 2001 and 2002.

Inflationary pressures also hit the poor in 2002 with the annual inflation rate for food rising above 20 %, while the overall rate was above 13 % in late 2002. However, successive interest rate rises helped bring inflation down to near 2 % in early 2004.

The Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR) found in 2004 that government now budgets the same proportion of spending each on defence, public order, health and debt servicing − about 9 % of the total budget. In addition the IPPR’s study on spending patterns found that more was being spent on defence, security, intelligence, medical aid for public servants, subsidising parastatals and public debt, while less was being spent on education, health, agriculture and housing. The study raised the point that it seems spending patterns are benefiting the privileged rather than the poor.

The 1991 and 2001 Population and Housing Censuses show that, if unpaid family workers are excluded, the number of employed people rose by less than 30,000 people in ten years. Agriculture is becoming much less important as a provider of incomes while employment in mining and manufacturing has also fallen. Most new employment opportunities have been created in service sectors that are hard to categorise. Employment in government and state-owned enterprises has remained almost constant although the numbers seem to be considerably underestimated. The growing labour force and the slow growth of employment have combined to push the rate of unemployment up sharply. The 2001 census estimated unemployment at 31 % of the potential labour force.

In 2003 the Government spent nearly N$1 billion on keeping parastatals going, up from N$79 million in 1991. Plans to introduce a Central Governance Agency (CGA) to promote and entrench greater openness and transparency within parastatals have stalled as the CGA, although in existence, is still awaiting legislation that will give it the power to act.

The 2002 SWAPO congress signalled a shift in attitude to the land problem. For the previous seven years the land reform programme had progressed at a slow pace based on the willing buyer-willing seller system. The path of expropriating land with compensation − a legal option since 1995 − had not been taken. In 2004 it was estimated that at the current rate of transfers it would take another 40 years before half of Namibia’s commercial land was in black hands. However, in 2002 the SWAPO congress − perhaps in reaction to heightened rhetoric on the issue and SWAPO’s support for Zimbabwean President Robert Mugabe − resolved that 192 farms should be targeted for expropriation, while the amount of money set aside for land purchases would increase from N$20 million to N$100 million a year.

The first moves to expropriate farms started in 2004, with around 20 farmers receiving letters requesting them to sell their land to the government or face being forced to do so. Namibia’s Constitution allows the expropriation of property in the public interest as long as just compensation is paid. Exactly how ‘public interest’ and ‘just compensation’ are defined by government is likely to become clearer in the coming months. Commercial farmers have objected to the move, complaining in particular that there seems to be a lack of clear criteria as to which farms are being targeted. The process could be long and drawn out, particularly if some farmers use the courts, and it is difficult to see how the N$100 million per year will be used effectively, considering that government found it hard to spend N$20 million a year.

Of land redistributed between 1995 and 2002, only 21 % has gone to the national resettlement programme, while the rest has been sold through the more market-orientated affirmative action loan scheme. There are concerns that the affirmative action scheme largely benefits better-off farmers and therefore the land reform efforts so far have done little to improve the lot of the poor. This has been underlined by criticisms of resettlement schemes intended to benefit the genuinely landless. Recently a parliamentary committee found that many of those who have been resettled are struggling due to a lack of resources and training.

Although the international press has often drawn parallels between Namibia and Zimbabwe, the approach in general in Namibia has been measured and cautious. No land grabs have taken place, despite the occasional bursts of rhetoric along such lines from SWAPO politicians and trade unionists.

Namibia has a widely-praised Constitution, which features a Bill of Rights (Chapter 3) that contains most of the civil and political rights outlined in international human rights instruments. Socio-economic rights (second-generation human rights) are hardly mentioned in Chapter 3, apart from the right to education, although such issues are mentioned in the chapter on the principles of State policy.

In general the human rights situation has improved since the late 1990s when instability in the north-east of the country was met with security clampdowns, detention without trial, and torture. However, no one has yet been prosecuted for the torture of suspects rounded up in the wake of the armed rebellion in Caprivi in August 1999. Five years after the attack the trial of over 120 suspects finally got underway in mid-2004, following criticisms from international human rights bodies over the lengthy delay.

The murder in October 2003 of controversial campaigner, Bernard Nekale Shevanyenga, who wanted the northern border shifted, raised concerns that the killing was politically inspired, but the case remains unresolved.

While the intensity of rhetoric against gays and lesbians (which reached a pitch when the Home Affairs Minister called for their ‘elimination’ in 2000) has lessened in the last year, there was a reminder that such language can encourage attacks on minorities when an army unit, apparently acting on its own, rounded up young men wearing earrings in Katutura over the Christmas holiday.

Violence against women and children continues to be a major problem in Namibia, and one that society is not prepared to tackle head on as indicated by the debate over the Domestic Violence Bill in 2002-03. Some male parliamentarians spoke against the legislation and chose to trivialise the issue. They said that women encouraged violence through their choice of clothing and used witchcraft to make their husbands impotent. The Bill was condemned because it allowed the State into the bedroom and this was considered inappropriate as the man is 'the head of the household'. After much nay-saying from male MPs and indignation from their female counterparts and a few men, the bill was passed.

Against this background, it was disturbing to note that the main organisation tackling the issue of violence against women and children − Women’s Solidarity − closed down in 2004 due to a lack of funding. The level of women’s representation in elected levels of government remained below the 30 % target set by SADC for 2005, except at the local authority level where a quota system ensured the proportion of women rose to 44%.

Several SWAPO politicians have launched verbal volleys at the judiciary, especially concerning the trial of Caprivians accused of treason, and made calls for changes in the way judges are selected. In the 2004 SWAPO manifesto, the party commits itself to changing the Constitution with the aim of broadening the composition of the Judicial Service Commission, which selects judges, apparently in reaction to these criticisms. This has raised fears that SWAPO is seeking to increase its influence over the one remaining pillar of the Constitution that it does not already dominate.

AIDS is the main cause of death in Namibia. The most recent UN Human Development Report (2004) estimated life expectancy at 45 years, down from 57 in 1991. The prevalence rate for the adult population (15-49 years) at the end of 2001 was 22.5 %. Unfortunately more recent data is not yet available, a time lag that frustrates those working in the field. At the end of 2001 some 230,000 people were estimated to be living with HIV-AIDS (30,000 of these were children under the age of 14).

Prevalence rates in all age groups are increasing apart from 15 to 19 year olds. The levelling off of the prevalence rate among pregnant women aged 15 to 19 at around 11-12 % since 1996 is seen as a ‘window of hope’, which may be the result of effective education campaigns targeting the young.

The worst-affected area of the country is Caprivi where the prevalence rate is 43 %, much higher than the national level of 22.5 %.

There are currently 2,000 people receiving anti-retroviral therapy (ART) via the State. This is a small minority of those believed to be in need of the drugs. In 2002 it was estimated that 50,000 people of the 230,000 HIV positive people required ART. Targets remain cautious, but the issue has not yet become highly politicised. In October it was reported that the waiting list for ART at Oshakati was over 1,000 people.

Orphanhood has become an indirect indicator for adult mortality with close to 14% of children under the age of 15 having lost one or both parents. According to UN figures, there are already more than 120 000 orphans and vulnerable children in Namibia and the number will reach 250 000 by the year 2020.

In April 2004 the government launched its Medium Term Plan III (2004-2009), which lays out a comprehensive response to the HIV-AIDS crisis. The plan is budgeted to cost N$3,6 billion and includes some ambitious targets such as reducing HIV prevalence among women aged 20 to 24 from 22 % to 12 % by 2009.

Namibia is set to receive N$990 million over a five-year period from the from the Global Fund set up to support campaigns against HIV-AIDS, tuberculosis and malaria. Of the first tranche of funding of N$128 million, N$106 million will go to HIV-AIDS, N$5 million to TB and N$7 million to malaria prevention. Although the majority of the funding goes to government, it is estimated that 30 % of the funding in the first year will be passed on to NGOs. The first monies are still expected to arrive before the end of 2004. Significant funding is also expected from the US President’s Emergency Plan for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR). Some concern has been expressed about the capacity of NGOs and CBOs to use such a large inflow of donor aid effectively.

In other areas of healthcare such as management of childhood illness and immunisation rates have improved while serious challenges like malaria, respiratory illnesses and diarrhoea are being addressed.

(b) Media, Freedom of Expression and Information & Communication Technologies

While the government kept quiet on the attacks on media freedom in other countries in SADC, such as Zimbabwe, journalists have, by and large, been able to go about their work freely in Namibia.

The Namibian Broadcasting Corporation's news and current affairs reporting remains largely sycophantic to the government and the ruling party. Calls for an independently-regulated public broadcaster have so far fallen on deaf ears. At present the Minister of Information has the power to appoint the NBC's board without public consultation.

For the first time media reporting on an election campaign will be monitored after IPPR, Misa Namibia and Media Tenor from South Africa joined forces to analyse coverage of the 2004 elections.

Government's relations with the independent media have been blighted by the continuing advertising ban on The Namibian over its critical reporting. However, the ban has failed to dent the popularity of the newspaper.

The fledgling community radio movement has been boosted by the creation of the Namibia Community Radio Network (NCRN) and the return to air of Katutura Community Radio (KCR). The NBC also introduced a San radio station in the Tsumkwe area − marking a step forward for one of Namibia's most marginalised communities.

Community newspapers have struggled to get off the ground, with the Southern Sun in the Karas region and the Caprivi Vision being the only two in existence in late 2004.

Misa Namibia’s attempt to appoint a media ombudsman and introduce a code of ethics largely fell flat, although the election of a new steering committee for the organisation in 2004 raised hopes that such initiatives could be revitalised.

Namibia has one mobile phone operator, which was recently reported to have over 300,000 users, while covering 90 % of the country. The government owns the company through Namibia Post and Telecom Holdings (NPTH). There are two Internet Access Service Providers (IASPs) in Namibia and several Internet Service Providers that use the IASPs’ networks. Internet can be accessed in most towns. There were estimated to be between 12,000 and 15,000 Internet subscribers in Namibia in 2003.

Increased competition could lead to lower Internet connectivity costs. However, a competitive telecoms environment, although agreed in principle, has yet to become a reality. A second mobile operator licence should be issued this year, while Telecom Namibia’s monopoly is due to end by the close of 2004. The draft Communications Bill intends to create a single regulatory body − the Communications Authority of Namibia − for the whole telecoms sector.

Schoolnet Namibia is an NGO assisting schools to gain access to computers and the Internet. Only 30 % of the 1520 or so primary and secondary schools in Namibia have telephones, electricity, library resource centres and appropriate ablution facilities. Schoolnet has installed small networks in over 150 schools and is building a wireless network to connect rural schools to the internet. Wireless Internet coverage at low cost will improve the poor’s access to ITC. Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) or Internet telephony, if legalised in Namibia, would also help bring down costs.

Government’s plans to introduce an e-governance programme should also speed up delivery of services such as provision of identity cards, passports, and other important documents as well as giving greater access to information. However, the e-governance project is in its early stages. Funding and skills development remain problem areas and, as a result, it will take several years for the project to become a reality.

Namibia will need to accelerate training and education in the IT sector, while making equipment and connectivity cheaper if it is to make ICT accessible beyond a small elite.

(c) Education and Language Rights

Concern still lingers about the switch from the Cape educational system to the Cambridge system, which was implemented in the mid-1990s. Many parents and some teachers still attribute high failure rates to the change in systems. The policy of not allowing Grade 10 learners to repeat is seen by some as simply dumping young people into unemployment, although they are able to undertake further studies with the Namibian College of Open Learning.

Adult literacy rates are over 80 % for men and women (defined as people over 15 who can read and write in any language).

Namibia is rich in languages, but they have not been developed equally. In the colonial era European languages were promoted at the expense of indigenous languages. The government adopted English as the official language at independence.

The government aims to promote fluency in one national language (English) while at the same time restoring mother tongues to positions of respect.

From 1992 English was phased in as the medium of instruction for Grades 4 to 12 (replacing Afrikaans), with the mother tongue being taught as a subject.

Mother tongue as a medium of instruction is supposed to be used from Grade 1 to 3, with English being taught as subject during those three years. However, this is not always possible for practical reasons. For example there is a lack of text books and learning material in some languages, such as Ju!hoansi. In the south Afrikaans has been taught as a mother tongue language, even though it is the second language of some learners. In a number of schools the different home language groups are too small each to justify their own teacher. As a result some languages may be ignored. Those who are taught in their mother tongue are effectively introduced to English as a second language from Grade 4. Studies have shown that a student cannot learn a second language unless there is basic competency in the mother tongue. However, the problems are compounded if the teacher is not competent enough to teach English, which is an acknowledged problem. The system can potentially leave the student with a poor command of both English and the mother tongue. As a result some parents have called for an English-only curriculum.

This concentration on English and the possible neglect of mother tongue teaching could pose a threat to indigenous languages in Namibia and effectively limit the involvement of many people in economic, political and social development. However, a confused language policy could also mean that competency in English is undermined.

Policy options for the future include the introduction of bilingual education, while promoting indigenous language learning through the training of teachers and provision of specialist books and educational material. The importance of promoting indigenous languages as a means of facilitating understanding and communication between Namibians cannot be underestimated.

Marked regional and ethnic disparities exist in school enrolment, performance, and gender balance. According to Unicef, only 30 % of children from the most marginalised ethnic group in the country, the San, enrol in school. Only 45 per cent of San children make it to Grade 5, compared to 92 per cent nationally. San and Himba children account for the majority of 16,500 children not in school.